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Funding of Innovative Therapies in Bulgaria
Innovative therapies are usually defined as newly introduced or modified health technologies with
unproven effect or side effect undertaken in the best interest of the patient. These therapies could
be situated at any point of the continuum: from genuine innovation with no precedent, to relative
innovation representing a small variation from standard therapy, or using a conventional treatment
in a different context (1). While the conception of innovative health technologies is not limited
by therapeutic form (drugs, devices, procedures) or disease indication, innovative therapies are
generally associated with expensive original drugs (2). Inclusion and provision of these therapies
tend to be one of the most resource-consuming tasks for national health systems and payers.
The above mentioned perceptions are well illustrated by the National Health Insurance Fund
(NHIF) in Bulgaria and its funding activities. NHIF is an independent public entity that was
established to carry out the mandatory health insurance in the country. Progress in medical science
and introduction of innovative therapies, together with aging population and increased prevalence
of chronic non-communicable diseases have put NIHF into a permanent situation of budget deficit.
Overspending has led to concerns about the overall sustainability of NHIF and the present health
insurance model in Bulgaria. Moreover, NHIF is currently lacking effective mechanisms to address
this growing financial risk.
National Health Insurance Fund budget is annually set and approved through a legal act by the
National Assembly of Bulgaria. Its funds that are intended to cover drug therapies are distributed
between two cost items as defined by the relevant legislation – costs for outpatient drugs and costs for
inpatient cancer drugs. The first category mainly includes outpatient medicinal therapies, although
a limited part of these funds are earmarked to medical devices and medical foods. NHIF total drug
expenditure steadily rose between 2011 and 2014 (Figure 1). These total costs were 268 million
EUR in 2011 and were expected to reach up to 488 million EUR in 2014 (3–7). At first sight, the
expansion of NHIF coverage during that period explains the significant increase of drug spending.
The provision of several categories of innovative medicinal therapies (such as rare disease and some
cancer drugs) was transferred from the Ministry of Health to NHIF in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
Those were all included in the outpatient drug budget category, thus increasing its spending share
in absolute and relative terms. Inpatient cancer drugs were also established as a separate cost item to
be funded by NHIF in 2012. This budget category alone was expected to stand at up to 100 million
EUR in 2014.
While nominally not all outpatient drugs paid by NHIF are innovative, Bulgarian stakehold-
ers have generally attributed deficit spending to outpatient medicinal therapies for rare disease
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FIGURE 1 | National Health Insurance Fund drug budget deficit for
2011–2014*,** (actual, non-discounted costs, reported in million
EUR). *No actual spending on inpatient cancer drugs is reported for 2011,
as these medicines were made part of (and subsequently paid by) NHIF
basket in 2012. **The amount of actual spending for 2014 is based on
forecasts.
and cancer. This is mostly due to the higher cost per patient
and in total of those drugs. A recently published study reported
important levels of cost and utilization uncertainty for some of
those medicinal therapies (8). NHIF was already experiencing
a budget deficit, so this insecurity of innovative therapies has
contributed for the restart of the political debate in the country
about NHIF expenditures.
National Health Insurance Fund deficit spending on drug ther-
apies was expected to be around 26.6% in 2014: 488 millions EUR
spent instead of 386 millions EUR initially allocated (Figure 1)
(6, 7). Outpatient drug deficit spending was 34% in 2011: 268
million EUR spent against 200 million EUR allocated (3, 7).
These numbers strongly alarmedBulgarian health authorities who
adopted legal amendments in drug pricing and reimbursement
regulations (2). This new policy framework seemed successful at
first – outpatient drug costs deficit was reduced in 2012 and 2013
(4, 5, 7). Nevertheless, outpatient drug deficit spending increased
again in 2014, counting for an overspending of 76 million EUR
(a deficit of 25%) (6, 7). From their inclusion in the mandatory
health insurance, inpatient cancer drugs demonstrated consistent
spending deficit too – 102% (a deficit spending of 30million EUR)
in 2012, 80% (a deficit spending of 37 million EUR) in 2013, and
35% (a deficit spending of 26 million EUR) in 2014 (3–6). These
fluctuations can not be linked to changes in inflation (a relatively
short period of 4 years) and/or currency exchange rate (Bulgaria
has a currency board that maintains a fixed exchange rate with
the euro).
Rationale of Performance-Based
Reimbursement
In a context of fiscal austerity, timely access to innovative therapies
has to be balanced against the priorities and resources of the health
system. Epidemiological, economical, and clinical uncertainty of
innovative health technologies imposes deeper reflections in the
process of public health priority setting and resource allocation
(9, 10). When regulating access, health authorities and payers
demand evidence on the number of patients to be treated, costs,
and health gains (11). For these reasons, different decision support
tools are explored to maximize the health benefits of the costs
incurred, while mitigating the risk of overspending.
Risk-sharing agreements (RSA) are performance-based
reimbursement schemes, in which the price, level, or nature
of reimbursement are tied to future performance measures of
clinical or intermediate endpoints ultimately related to patient
quality or quantity of life (12–15). Generation and collection of
new evidence is a key component of these contracts between
manufactures and payers. Real-world data on the therapy’s
performance subsequently assist in making informed decisions
on access and coverage.
Classification of RSA relies on the type of results to be
achieved: these agreements could be either health or non-health
outcome-based (12). Health outcome-based RSA are linked to
the achievement and/or proof of certain health benefits in a
patient population for a period of time, whereas non-health
outcome-based RSA are mostly tied to negotiating price and/or
consumption levels. Non-health outcomes-based RSA are, how-
ever, mainly guided by financial considerations, without taking
into account the health benefits at individual and population level.
This practice itself does not contribute for improving the national
health system’s effectiveness, as well as no new evidence is
generated.
Health outcomes-based RSA are often split into two main cat-
egories (12, 13): conditional coverage, where coverage is granted
conditional on the initiation of a program of data collection, and
performance-linked reimbursement, where reimbursement level
for covered products is tied to the measure of real-world clinical
outcomes. Under a conditional coverage scheme, reimbursement
decision is conditioned upon the collection of additional popula-
tion level evidence, from a pre-specified scientific study, to sup-
port continued, expanded, or withdrawal of coverage. The second
category, performance-linked reimbursement, is characterized by
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outcomes guarantees, in which themanufacturer provides rebates,
refunds, or price adjustments if the product fails to meet the
agreed upon outcome targets. In practice, however, RSA very
often include components from both subcategories depending on
the uncertainty that is being addressed.
Prospects of Risk-Sharing Agreements for
Innovative Therapies in a Context of Deficit
Spending in Bulgaria
Improving patients’ access to new therapies is legitimate and in
line with progress and innovation in medicine. Despite well docu-
mented trend to improve Bulgarian patients’ access to innovative
therapies, availability and accessibility of those therapies largely
remain limited compared to other EU member states (8). Of
course, Bulgarian national health system has to operate within
largely fewer and very limited resources. Thus, any source of
uncertainty that leads to significant overspending could jeop-
ardize the overall sustainability of the local healthcare model.
However, nowadays dominating concepts of health technology
assessment (HTA) and evidence-based medicine focus not on
patient access restrictions and cost containment, but on health
outcomes surveillance and real-world evidence collection (10). As
coverage policy in Bulgaria remains subject to cost-minimization,
a growing number of countries switch to cost-effectiveness – to
spend the available resources wisely, in a way that will generate the
greatest amount of health benefits to the greatest number of people
(16–18). Reference pricing, centralized tenders and budgetary
constraints do lower drug expenditure indeed, but eventually they
all lack the effective control of outcomes obtained. In fact, these
policy tools offer a temporary solution, which ultimately does not
eliminate the risk of budget deficit, as observed in Bulgaria.
When rare diseases and cancer medicinal therapies were trans-
ferred to NHIF, the payer took measures to control uncertainty
in cost and utilization. NHIF determined clinical criteria to be
met in order to initiate and then to continue a therapy. Coverage
is renewed every 6months upon achieving predefined clinical
outcomes. This mechanism falls in the category of conditional
treatment continuation, which is a standard feature in many RSA.
Such scheme ensures that only patients that benefit from treat-
ment remain on treatment (12). However, a serious shortage of
the approach, currently applied by NHIF, is the lack of man-
agement of the potential overspending that may occur. Linking
reimbursement status to performance does not directly address
this issue. Another drawback of the present practice in Bulgaria is
the evidence gap about innovative therapies. NHIF is monitoring,
in fact, a basic set of surrogate outcomes in patients in order to
continue reimbursement, but no efforts are made to assess and
appraise these real-world data in aggregate and to use this new
knowledge in policy-making. In this context, evidence collection
is a prerequisite for overcoming difficulties in transparency, legit-
imacy, and feasibility of priority setting and resource allocation in
the field of public health.
Risk-sharing agreements are conceived as a response to all
the above mentioned concerns (19). We call for the legal def-
inition and practical implementation of RSA in Bulgaria. This
mechanism is essential for the sustainable access to innovative
medicinal therapies in the country. A hypothetical framework
of RSA should include the following elements: early dialog and
fast-track first-stage evaluation, post-marketing monitoring and
patient registry, independent HTA report, and final informed
reimbursement decision-making. The application of RSA should
begin with an initial, more implicit evaluation of innovative health
technologies. The main reason is the fact that most of these
therapies are often the very first therapeutic option available for
the patients in question (20). RSAwithmandatory post-marketing
surveillance will allow patients to start therapy early, thereby
avoiding clinical complications and further medical expenses. At
the same time, regulators and payers can get data on the real-world
effectiveness and utilization of the product (21). Last but not least,
RSA should contain an agreed mechanism for reducing the risk of
overspending, sharing the burden of budget deficit among payers
and manufacturers.
Lack of reliable epidemiological, clinical, and economic evi-
dence, generated in local settings, is a substantial obstacle for
effective planning and management of healthcare costs in Bul-
garia. Especially in the case of rare diseases, the small num-
ber of patients and the impracticability to conduct large-scale
randomized controlled clinical trials call for alternative study
designs to generate and collect new evidence. RSA experience
demonstrates that post-marketing studies and patient registries
are the most appropriate tool for streamlining the processes of
HTA and reimbursement decision-making for innovative ther-
apies. Evidence generated from such studies at national level
is more consistent and reliable, because it reflects the specifics
of the local population and health system (9, 10). Bulgarian
health authorities should actively promote the collection of real-
world evidence, which is fundamental for rigorous and objective
HTA, as well as for subsequent final reimbursement-decision-
making.
Conclusion
An access scheme that combines features from both health and
non-health outcome-based RSA achieves two objectives simul-
taneously. First, it would effectively restrict the possibility of
budget deficit in the healthcare system. Second and even more
importantly, it would allow coverage decisions to be consistent
and coherent, following a transparent procedure and clear criteria.
Generation and collection of new epidemiological, clinical, and
economic real-world evidence ensure that inform reimbursement
decisions have been made and costs incurred have produced
greatest benefits to a greatest number of people.
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